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COMMENTS
A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY OF
REFOULEMENT: THE INADEQUACIES OF
PROCEDURES TO PROTECT VULNERABLE
NONCITIZENS FROM RETURN TO
PERSECUTION, TORTURE, OR DEATH
by: Lexie M. Ford*
ABSTRACT
Due primarily to increases in individuals fleeing violence and turmoil in
Central America, over 40% of noncitizens arriving in the United States are put
on a fast-track removal process and subsequently claim fear of returning to
their home countries. A decade ago, the number was only 5%. This influx of
asylum-seekers at the border has led to tension between those who wish to
protect them and those who view such migrants as “invaders.” In 2019 and
2020, the Trump Administration proffered sweeping regulatory changes with
the aim to substantively and procedurally restrict noncitizens’ access to protection from persecution and torture in their home countries. Although not all of
these proposals may ultimately go into effect, it is vital to explore the legality
of such provisions lest they reappear in subsequent administrations.
Pursuant to domestic and international law, the United States is subject to
the non-refoulement obligation, which prohibits forcibly returning a refugee
to a country that threatens their life or freedom. All humans have the fundamental right to not be returned to a country where they will be persecuted or
tortured, regardless of their legal status in the country where they seek protection. In the United States, noncitizens facing qualifying persecution or torture
upon return to their home countries are entitled to protection in the form of
statutory withholding of removal (“withholding”) or withholding or deferral
of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT protection”).
This Comment argues that noncitizens vindicating their non-refoulement
rights by seeking withholding or CAT protection must receive stronger procedural protections because of the fundamental interests at stake. Specifically,
two issues are addressed. First, the use of the “reasonable possibility” standard
of proof at the fear screening stage, a practice expanded in recent years, is
inappropriate and a violation of the non-refoulement obligation. This standard is suited for final determinations on the merits, not threshold screenings.
Because of the well-documented problems with fear screenings, even absent an
increased standard of proof, this practice would result in an impermissible risk
that individuals with valid claims would be returned to face persecution, torture, or even death without ever being fairly heard. Second, the unique position of these noncitizens, from legal and humanitarian perspectives, should
entitle them to Constitutional Due Process Clause protections. Because their
right to non-refoulement is not subject to the discretion of the Executive, the
denial of due process cannot be justified by the “entry fiction,” the legal doctrine that gives certain noncitizens inside the United States limited constitutional protections because the law considers them to be detained at the border.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V9.I1.5
* J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M University School of Law, May 2022. I would like
to thank my advisor, Professor Fatma Marouf, for her guidance throughout the writ-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!1

Admission to the United States has never been as simple or as altruistic of a process as the above inscription on the Statue of Liberty
suggests.2 Previously, most individuals facing deportation had the opportunity to make their case in front of a judge, but that right began to
disappear beginning in 1996 with over 80% of deportations being nonjudicial by 2013.3 Now, thanks to the process known as “expedited
removal,” many potential immigrants who arrive at the U.S. border
without documentation are deported in as little as a single day without
appearing before a judge and without a right to appeal.4 The only way
to pause this swift removal process is to express a fear of persecution
or torture in a particular country or an intent to apply for asylum,5 and
even then, the procedural safeguards in place are vastly insufficient,
which is the focus of this Comment.
Due primarily to increases in individuals fleeing violence and turmoil in Central America, over 40% of noncitizens arriving in the
United States are put on a fast-track removal process and subsequently claim fear of returning to their home countries.6 A decade
ago, the number was only 5%.7 This influx of asylum-seekers8 at the
1. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, POETRY FOUND. (1883), https://
www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus [https://perma.cc/YVR59K9T] (poem inscribed on the Statue of Liberty).
2. See, e.g., John Higham, American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective,
21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 213 (1956).
3. Sarah Stillman, When Deportation Is a Death Sentence, NEW YORKER (Jan. 8,
2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-deathsentence [https://perma.cc/FJ4K-G7J2]; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the
Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 184 (2017) (explaining that
immigration officers issued 83% of removal orders issued in 2013, “thus bypassing the
immigration courts entirely”).
4. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2020); HILLEL
R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10150, IMMIGRATION LAWS REGULATING THE
ADMISSION AND EXCLUSION OF ALIENS AT THE BORDER 2 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/homesec/LSB10150.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCF2N2X2]; Fact Sheet: Expedited Removal, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (June 4, 2019), https://immigrationforum.org/article/factsheet-expedited-removal/ [https://perma.cc/8MXK-WS5C].
5. SMITH, supra note 4, at 2.
6. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829,
33,830–31 (July 16, 2019) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 1003, 1208).
7. Id.
8. References to “asylum-seekers” in this Comment refer to individuals seeking
any kind of fear-based immigration relief, including statutory withholding of removal
or protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.
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border has led to tension between those who wish to protect them9
and those who view such migrants as “invaders.”10
Regardless of political agenda, the United States is bound by the
international law doctrine of non-refoulement, meaning that it may
not return any individual to a country where their life or freedom is
threatened.11 However, the procedures in place to ensure non-refoulement are minimal, and even these are not properly enforced.12 A 2014
American Civil Liberties Union report indicated that among interviewees who were removed without seeing an immigration judge, 55%
“said they were not asked about fear of persecution or torture” while
40% of those who reported fear of return after being asked were “ordered deported without seeing an asylum officer.”13 As a result of the
flawed fear screening system, there are already numerous accounts of
asylum-seekers being subsequently killed when returned to their
countries of origin.14
In addition to this decades-long trend of turning away fearful migrants at the “golden door,” regulatory changes in 201915 and 202016
have attempted17 to further narrow the proverbial door in ways that
raise serious humanitarian concerns.18 Specifically, one proposal sug9. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L REFREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 4 (2016), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/
Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/D43C-PR2M].
10. See, e.g., John Fritze, Trump Used Words Like ‘Invasion’ and ‘Killer’ to Discuss Immigrants at Rallies 500 Times: USA TODAY Analysis, USA TODAY, https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/08/trump-immigrants-rhetoric-criticized-el-paso-dayton-shootings/1936742001 (Aug. 21, 2019, 10:18 AM) [https://
perma.cc/P45C-RBB7].
11. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Introductory
Note of CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 3
(Dec. 2010), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/conventionprotocol-relating-status-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/PT3G-J28N] [hereinafter
UNHCR Introductory Note].
12. See infra Section III.C.2.
13. Stillman, supra note 3.
14. See, e.g., Kevin Sieff, When Death Awaits Deported Asylum Seekers, WASH.
POST (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/whendeath-awaits-deported-asylum-seekers/ [https://perma.cc/5F72-QCNN]; Stillman,
supra note 3.
15. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829,
33,830–31 (July 16, 2019) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 1003, 1208).
16. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208,
235, 1003, 1208, 1235).
17. Some of the rules have been enjoined from going into effect. See Pangea Legal
Servs. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 512 F. Supp. 3d 966 (N.D. Cal. 2021). See infra
Section III.A for further discussion.
18. See, e.g., Amanda Holpuch, Trump Has Nearly Destroyed US Refugee Program, Experts Say, GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2019, 1:01 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/27/trump-refugee-cap-asylum-program [https://
perma.cc/4EQC-Q887]; Heidi Altman et al., The Trump Administration’s Checklist to
Destroy the U.S. Asylum System, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (May 22, 2018), https:/
LIGIOUS

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL101.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 5

POSSIBILITY OF REFOULEMENT

8-NOV-21

14:31

213

gested that noncitizens seeking protection from refoulement through
statutory withholding of removal (“withholding”) or withholding or
deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT protection”) would undergo initial fear screenings using the
“reasonable possibility” standard.19 This standard of proof would require that these individuals demonstrate (a) “a reasonable possibility
that [they] would be persecuted” on account of a protected ground in
the country of removal or (b) “a reasonable possibility that [they]
would be tortured in the country of removal.”20 The standard of proof
was previously the same as the current standard for seeking asylum:
presenting a significant possibility of being able to establish qualifying
persecution or torture.21 Given the circumstances of these interviews
and the vulnerable positions of arriving asylum-seekers, both the reasonable possibility and the asylum standards are quite difficult burdens to meet.22 An additional proposal suggested that a negative fear
finding at the interview stage become final unless the noncitizen were
to affirmatively request review, whereas currently the finding is forwarded for review by an immigration judge (“IJ”) unless the noncitizen affirmatively declines review.23
Despite the substantial risk that asylum officers will improperly apply the law and deny noncitizens seeking protection a chance to be
fully heard, these procedural deficiencies cannot be adequately challenged because of the lack of judicial review of fear screening determinations24 and the refusal to afford constitutional due process rights to
noncitizens seeking to vindicate their non-refoulement rights—even
/immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/trump-administrations-checklist-destroy-us-asylumsystem [https://perma.cc/JN5P-JPG5]; Erika Guevara-Rosas, Trump’s Efforts to End
Asylum Are an All-Out Assault on Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 27, 2020, 6:01
AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/trumps-efforts-end-asylum-assault-human-rights [https://perma.cc/E37U-X6VA].
19. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. at 80,277.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See infra Section IV.B.
23. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. at 80,279 (“The Departments further amend 8
CFR 208.30(g) and 8 CFR 1208.30(g)(2), which address procedures for negative fear
determinations for aliens in the expedited removal process. In 8 CFR 208.30(g)(1),
the Departments treat an alien’s refusal to indicate whether he or she desires review
by an immigration judge as declining to request such review. Also, in 8 CFR 208.31,
the Departments treat a refusal as declining to request review within the context of
reasonable fear determinations.”); Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,273 (proposed June 15, 2020) (“Currently, 8 CFR 208.30(g) provides that when an alien
receives notice of a negative determination, the asylum officer inquires whether the
alien wishes to have an immigration judge review the decision. If that alien refuses to
indicate whether he or she desires such review, DHS treats this as a request for review
by an immigration judge.”).
24. See infra Section III.C.3.
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though they are physically present in the United States and face deprivation of life and liberty by state actors.25
This Comment argues that noncitizens vindicating their nonrefoulement rights by seeking withholding or CAT protection must
receive stronger procedural protections because of the fundamental
interests at stake. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of
the non-refoulement obligation, the categories of immigration relief
available to individuals seeking fear-based protection, and the procedural barriers that stand in their way. Part III argues that using the
reasonable possibility standard of proof in the fear screening context
is a violation of the non-refoulement obligation. Section III.A gives an
overview of the recent regulatory attempts to expand the use of this
standard. Section III.B explains the standard in comparison with the
“significant possibility” standard—the appropriate threshold screening standard. Section III.C highlights the differences between the fear
screening setting and the asylum merits hearing to illustrate why the
reasonable possibility standard is appropriate for one and not the
other. Section III.D explains how the use of the reasonable possibility
standard for fear screening is not only inappropriate—it is also a violation of the non-refoulement obligation. Finally, Part IV argues that
noncitizens seeking withholding and CAT protection should be afforded full constitutional due process rights and applies the Mathews
v. Eldridge due process test to show that using the reasonable possibility standard at the fear screening stage is unconstitutional.
II. BACKGROUND: RIGHTS, RELIEF, AND PROCEDURAL HURDLES
FOR ASYLUM-SEEKERS
A. The Non-Refoulement Obligation: Protecting the Most
Fundamental Human Right
Non-refoulement is an “international legal norm” introduced by the
1951 United Nations (“UN”) Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (“the Convention”).26 According to the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), “[t]he principle of non-refoulement is so fundamental that no reservations or derogations may be made to it. It provides that no one shall expel or return
(‘refouler’) a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom.”27
25. See infra Section IV.A.
26. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Non-Refoulement Under the Trump Administration,
ASIL INSIGHTS (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/23/issue/11/nonrefoulement-under-trump-administration#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/SDF2-BKAN];
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
27. UNHCR Introductory Note, supra note 11, at 3.
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While the United States did not join the Convention itself,28 it did sign
and ratify the 1967 UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Refugee Protocol”), which incorporates the terms of the Convention by reference.29 This non-refoulement obligation is extended by
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention Against Torture”) to
prohibit returning “a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.”30 The United States signed and ratified the Convention Against Torture by 1990, subject to various “reservations,”
“understandings,” and “declarations.”31
The Convention carves out only two exceptions to the non-refoulement obligation: It does not protect refugees who (1) are a “danger to
the security of the country” or (2) are a “danger to the community”
due to conviction of a “particularly serious crime.”32 Academics have
long asserted that any other countervailing interests that the government may have, including “expediency and economy,” “political considerations,” or a general preference against criminals, do not exempt
it from the fundamental obligation to protect the human right of nonrefoulement.33
Although the United States has ratified two treaties invoking the
non-refoulement obligation, the mechanics by which the United States
is bound by this obligation are ambiguous. The Senate Resolution of
28. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATE PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONRELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL, https://
www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWW5U5U2].
29. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 26; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
30. G.A. Res. 39/46 pt. 1, art. 3, United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10, 1984).
31. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1990), https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/100th-congress/20/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/948D-TQ66].
32. U.N. Convention, supra note 26, art. 33(2).
33. See Kathleen M. Keller, A Comparative and International Law Perspective on
the United States (Non)Compliance with Its Duty of Non-Refoulement, 2 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 183, 184 (1999) (“The United State[s’] interest in expediency and
economy pale in comparison with the importance of the fundamental human rights
norm of non-refoulement embodied by the Refugee Convention.”); Scott M. Martin,
Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 7 IMMIGR. & NAT’Y L. REV. 650, 670 (1982) (“The progress of Congress and the
courts toward fuller recognition of the principle of non-refoulement is appropriate
and desirable. Especially important is more careful judicial review . . . since political
considerations may undermine the executive branch’s observance of the non-refoulment principle.”); Shirley Llain Arenilla, Violations to the Principle of Non-Refoulement Under the Asylum Policy of the United States, 15 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 283, 311 (citing a UNHCR opinion, which states that denying withholding due to conviction of a “particularly serious crime” without a separate “danger to the community” assessment is “contrary to United State[s’]
obligations under international law” and “contrary to the spirit, purpose and requirements of Article 33(2)” of the Convention) (citation omitted).
VENTION
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Ratification of the Convention Against Torture contains an express
provision that Articles 1 through 16, which include the non-refoulement provision, are not self-executing; therefore, the Convention Articles had no legal effect in the U.S. judicial system until subsequent
legislation and regulation implemented them.34 There is no such language accompanying the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to
Ratification of the Refugee Protocol;35 however, there is evidence that
the courts did not view the treaty as directly enforceable, at least insofar as enforceability would require substituting their “independent
judgment” for the statutorily granted discretionary power of the Attorney General to effectuate or withhold removal.36 Courts repeatedly
held that the ratification of the Refugee Protocol did not mandate
changes in U.S. immigration law.37
It took an act of Congress, the Refugee Act of 1980,38 to officially
align the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) with the Refugee
Protocol’s non-refoulement obligation.39 The INA was amended to
prohibit removal of an individual to a country “if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened
in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion,”40 a change that was
“based directly upon the language of the [Refugee] Protocol and
that . . . [was] intended . . . [to] be construed consistent with the Protocol.”41 In I.N.S. v. Stevic, the Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation and suggested that non-refoulement was an obligation that
existed before codification.42 The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) relocated this provision within the INA, but the obligation remains the same.43
34. See S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20; Frederic L. Kirgis, International Agreements
and U.S. Law, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 27, 1997), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/2/
issue/5/international-agreements-and-us-law [https://perma.cc/4KR2-H4FY]. For a full
discussion of the implementation of the CAT non-refoulement obligation, see Samuel
L. David, A Foul Immigration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretation of the Non-Refoulement
Obligation Under the Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 769,
795–804 (2003).
35. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 90-27 (1968), https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/
90th-congress/27/resolution-text [https://perma.cc/9WCK-UP2F].
36. See Martin, supra note 33, at 664–66.
37. Id. at 666.
38. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
39. See Martin, supra note 33, at 662–63.
40. Id. at 662 (quoting Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
41. Id. at 663 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 161).
42. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 415, 421 (1984); see also Keller, supra note 33, at
194–95 (explaining further that the Court’s opinion in Stevic shows an understanding
that the United States’ non-refoulement obligation predated codification).
43. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 241(b)(3)(A), 110 Stat. 3009–602 (1996) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be
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External sources can be instructive in determining what practices
are in line with the treaties’ mandate. For example, the Committee
Against Torture (“the Committee”) is an international body that provides guidance on and monitors the implementation of the Convention Against Torture.44 The Committee has published a set of “best
practices” that it recommends state parties adopt as “preventive measures against possible violations of the principle of ‘non-refoulement.’ ”45 Some of the recommendations include “[p]roviding access
of the person alleging previous torture that might be deported to a
lawyer and free legal aid when necessary” and “[t]he right of appeal
by the person concerned against a deportation order to an independent administrative or judicial body within a reasonable period of
time from the notification of that order and with the suspensive effect
of its enforcement.”46
B. Overview of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and the
Convention Against Torture
Persons in the United States or at its border who fear returning to
their countries of origin typically seek to apply for asylum. Asylum is a
discretionary form of immigration relief that may be available to an
individual who qualifies as a “refugee,” defined by the INA as “any
person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and
who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . that country because of
persecution47 or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”); see also Keller, supra note 33,
at 195 (“The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRAIRA) changed the withholding provision, renaming it ‘Restriction on Removal.’
Nothing in the new law, however, indicated that the mandatory nature of the provision had changed.”).
44. Committee Against Torture, Monitoring the Prevention of Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. HUM. RTS., https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/CATIntro.aspx [https://perma.cc/QU8HTN2T].
45. Committee Against Torture, Draft, General Comment No. 1 (2017) on the Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, U.N. HUM.
RTS. 4 (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CAT/GCArticle3/
CAT-C-GC-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Bpp-EGX7].
46. Id.
47. According to a 2019 training for USCIS officers, the contemplated harm must
be “sufficiently serious to amount to persecution” (for example, more than mere “discrimination or harassment” or “brief detention without mistreatment”), but “persecution is a broader concept than threats to ‘life or freedom’” (economic and
psychological harm may rise to the level of persecution). USCIS, RAIO DIRECTORATE–OFFICER TRAINING: DEFINITION OF PERSECUTION AND ELIGIBILITY BASED ON
PAST PERSECUTION 11, 13, 18, 20 (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/document/foia/Persecution_LP_RAIO.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5S6-U833] (quoting Stevic, 467 U.S. at 428 fn. 22.
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political opinion.”48 This statutory definition limits asylum relief to
those who fear harm based on one of the five protected grounds. Additionally, even those who fit the definition of a refugee may be
barred from asylum for various reasons.49 The ultimate burden of
proof for an asylum-seeker is to convince an IJ that they have a “wellfounded fear” of persecution, meaning that they have a genuine, subjective fear of persecution and that there is an objective, “reasonable
possibility” that the persecution will actually occur.50 For individuals
who can make it through all the statutory, regulatory, and judicial
hoops, the rewards are great: Asylees are immediately eligible to work
in the United States, may apply for permanent residence after being in
the United States for one year, and may obtain derivative status for
their spouses and children.51
For individuals who fear returning to their countries of origin but
are denied asylum due to negative discretionary factors or statutory or
regulatory bars, two types of immigration relief are available: (1) statutory withholding of removal and (2) withholding or deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture.52 Unlike asylum,
these forms of relief are not discretionary—any individual who qualifies receives relief.53 However, despite the mandatory nature and absence of non-criminal bars (such as failure to apply within one year of
arrival to the United States),54 very few individuals actually receive
this type of relief.55 This is because withholding and CAT protection
are only available to individuals who can prove a very high risk of
severe harm.56
48. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2020).
49. Bars to asylum include, among other things, firm resettlement in a third country, previous denial of asylum, participation in persecution of others, and conviction
of a particularly serious crime. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., DEP’T OF JUST., FACT
SHEET: ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE PROTECTIONS 2 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8HX9-W9FB] [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
50. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i) (2021).
51. Benefits and Responsibilities of Asylees, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/benefits-and-responsibilities-of-asylees (Mar. 8,
2015) [https://perma.cc/UX43-WSK8].
52. FACT SHEET, supra note 49, at 5.
53. IMMIGR. EQUAL., Withholding of Removal—A Higher Standard, in ASYLUM
MANUAL § 6.1, https://immigrationequality.org/asylum/asylum-manual/immigrationbasics-withholding-of-removal/ [https://perma.cc/5NAQ-MH6W].
54. See Fact Sheet: Withholding of Removal and the U.N. Convention Against Torture—No Substitute for Asylum, Putting Refugees at Risk, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Nov.
2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/CAT_Withholding.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34T3-K88E] [hereinafter Withholding of Removal Fact Sheet].
55. Id. (“In fiscal year 2016, the immigration courts granted only 6% of withholding applications and less than 5% of adjudicated CAT cases.”).
56. Id.
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Withholding, the United States’ codification of the non-refoulement
obligation, is available to refugees who can prove that they are more
likely than not to be persecuted57 “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”58 CAT protection is available to individuals who can prove that
it is more likely than not they will be tortured59 by their home country’s government or with its acquiescence.60 As their names suggest,
these types of relief are more limited than a grant of asylum. Withholding and CAT protection grantees may not be removed to the
country where they have proven they would likely face future harm,
but they may be removed to a third country.61 Additionally, there is
no path to permanent residence, there is no automatic work authorization, and there is no grant of status or protection to family members.62 Finally, CAT protection may be temporary; if the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) determines that the individual is no
longer likely to be tortured, the protection may be terminated.63 Despite these limitations, withholding and CAT protection are important
humanitarian safeguards, and their integrity must be preserved.
C. Procedural Barriers: Expedited Removal Proceedings and Fear
Screening Interviews
Although asylum, withholding, and CAT protection protect fundamental interests and are legally and factually complex claims, noncitizens seeking this protection must overcome various hurdles before
getting the opportunity to present their cases to a judge.64 All individuals lacking valid entry documents who present themselves at a U.S.
port of entry (termed “arriving aliens”) or who are “apprehended
within 100 miles of the U.S. border within fourteen days” of entry,
among other things, are subject to expedited removal proceedings
pursuant to INA § 235.65 This procedure allows removal of these undocumented individuals without a hearing or administrative review.66
Immigration advocates have long argued that expedited removal itself
violates the United States’ non-refoulement obligation.67 The only
57. For the purposes of withholding, persecution refers to a threat to the individual’s “life or freedom.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (2021).
58. Id.; Withholding of Removal Fact Sheet, supra note 54.
59. Torture is severe pain or suffering that is intentionally inflicted. FACT SHEET,
supra note 49, at 7.
60. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a) (2021).
61. FACT SHEET, supra note 49, at 6–7.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 8.
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
65. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2020); SMITH,
supra note 4, at 2.
66. SMITH, supra note 4, at 2.
67. See Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken:
How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
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way to pause this swift removal process is to express an intent to apply
for asylum or a fear of persecution in a particular country.68 These
asylum-seekers are then referred to a DHS asylum officer for what is
generally referred to as a “credible fear interview.”69 Here, the officer
determines, based on their questioning of the asylum-seeker, whether
the individual has shown a “significant possibility” of eligibility for
asylum.70 Potential claims for withholding or CAT protection are also
evaluated.71
If the individual receives a positive fear determination, they are
placed in formal removal proceedings and remain in immigration detention during the pendency of the proceedings.72 An individual who
receives a negative fear determination, meaning the DHS officer did
not find it likely that they would qualify for asylum, withholding, or
CAT protection, may seek review of their claim by an IJ.73 If they do
not affirmatively request administrative review or the IJ concurs with
the negative fear determination, they are ordered removed and have
no further procedural remedy.74
This process has received increased attention recently, both from
those who wish to protect asylum-seekers75 and those who view asylum-seekers as “invaders.”76 This is likely due to the fact that “the
overall percentage of [noncitizens] subject to expedited removal and
referred . . . for a credible-fear interview on claims of a fear of return
has jumped from approximately [5%] to above [40%]” in the past decade.77 This increase is primarily because of an influx of migrants seeking refuge from violence and turmoil in Central America, particularly
the three Northern Triangle countries: Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador.78 Allegedly to mitigate the strain on the U.S. immigration
167, 170 (2006). Over one hundred organizations, including Amnesty International
USA and Human Rights Watch, have called for the Biden Administration to rescind
the expedited removal policy. Over 100 Groups Urge Biden to Fully Rescind Title 42
Expulsions, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 30, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2021/06/30/over-100-groups-urge-biden-fully-rescind-title-42-expulsions# [https://
perma.cc/XZ5R-Z99U].
68. SMITH, supra note 4, at 2.
69. Id.; CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 9, at 11–12.
70. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EOIR POLICY MANUAL
§ 7.4(d)(1), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-policy-manual/7/4 (Jan. 10, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/FRH3-BKMH].
71. SMITH, supra note 4, at 2.
72. Id. at 2–3.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 9, at 11–12.
76. See, e.g., Fritze, supra note 10.
77. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829,
33,830–31 (July 16, 2019) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 1003, 1208).
78. See Katherine Shattuck, Comment, Preventing Erroneous Expedited Removals: Immigration Judge Review and Requests for Reconsideration of Negative Credible
Fear Determinations, 93 WASH. L. REV. 459, 467 (2018); Scott Rempell, Credible
Fears, Unaccompanied Minors, and the Causes of the Southwestern Border Surge, 18
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system created by the “large number of meritless asylum claims,” regulators have introduced sweeping regulatory changes to the detriment
of the many asylum-seekers with bona fide claims.79
III. AN IMPERMISSIBLE THREAT TO THE FULFILLMENT OF NONREFOULEMENT OBLIGATIONS: USE OF THE “REASONABLE
POSSIBILITY” STANDARD IN INITIAL FEAR SCREENINGS
A. Recent Attempts to Radically Change Asylum Regulations
The Trump Administration led a wholesale attack on asylum-seekers during its four-year tenure.80 This Comment focuses on the clear
intent to increase the standard of proof for a positive fear finding with
respect to withholding and CAT protection.81 If the 2019 and 2020
rule changes were to be fully realized, noncitizens subject to expedited
removal proceedings would have to meet the “reasonable possibility”
standard of proof to have access to withholding of removal and CAT
proceedings.82 Specifically, the standard requires that the individual
demonstrate to the asylum officer (a) “a reasonable possibility that
[they] would be persecuted” on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion in
the country of removal, or (b) “a reasonable possibility that [they]
would be tortured in the country of removal.”83 The standard of proof
was previously the same as for asylum: a “significant possibility that
the [individual] can establish . . . eligibility.”84

CHAP. L. REV. 337, 340 (2015); António Guterres, Foreword to U.N. HIGH COMM’R
FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO (2015), http://
www.unhcr.org/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html [https://perma.cc/
B8B5-GYYH].
79. See Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. at 33,831.
80. See, e.g., How the Trump Administration Is Using COVID-19 to End Asylum,
INT’L RESCUE COMM., https://www.rescue.org/article/how-trump-administration-using-covid-19-end-asylum (Sept. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/UZ6L-LDMR].
81. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and
Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,268 (proposed June 15, 2020) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235) (“This rule also proposes clarifying
and raising the statutory withholding of removal screening standard and the torturerelated screening standard under the CAT regulations for stowaways and aliens in
expedited removal.”).
82. Id. at 36,269.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 36,268 (emphasis added).
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Currently, only the 2019 regulatory changes have gone into effect.85
The 2020 Final Rule was set to go into effect on January 11, 2021,86
but on January 8, 2021, a judge in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction suspending the implementation of the rule pending proceedings challenging the rule.87 Now that the Biden Administration is in power, the fate
of this rule is uncertain. However, it should be noted that the provision expanding the use of the reasonable possibility standard for fear
screenings was not specifically challenged in the complaint associated
with the preliminary injunction.88 Even if this particular rule is abandoned or defeated in litigation, it is vital to explore the legality of the
provisions lest they reappear in subsequent administrations.
B. The “Reasonable Possibility” Standard Explained
The reasonable possibility standard of proof is not appropriate for
use in initial fear screenings, and this is best illustrated by comparison
with the “significant possibility” standard, which was designed for
threshold screenings.89 First, while the linguistic effect of a change
from “significant” to “reasonable” is ambiguous at best,90 the legal
effect is clear and harmful. Second, interpreting the language of the
standards indicates that the reasonable possibility standard requires
the officer to make a determination on the merits regarding the possibility of persecution or torture itself, whereas the significant possibility standard requires only speculation as to what the individual might
establish at a future hearing.
The significant possibility standard requires that the individual
seeking relief “demonstrate a substantial and realistic possibility of
succeeding” in immigration court.91 This is meant to be a low screen85. The 2019 Interim Final Rule became effective on July 16, 2019. Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 33,830 (July 16, 2019) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208, 1003, 1208).
86. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235).
87. Pangea Legal Servs. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 512 F. Supp. 3d 966, 969 (N.D.
Cal. 2021).
88. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Immigr. Equal. v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 3:20-cv-09258, Doc. 1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020).
89. See USCIS, ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING: ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY PART
IV: BURDEN OF PROOF, STANDARDS OF PROOF, AND EVIDENCE, AM. IMMIGR. LAWS.
ASS’N 11–13 (Sept. 14, 2006) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S11491-02 (Sept. 27, 1996) (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)), https://www.aila.org/infonet/aobt-lesson-burden-standards-proof-evidence [https://perma.cc/YK7E-JJD8] [hereinafter STANDARDS OF
PROOF TRAINING].
90. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and
Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,268 (proposed June 15, 2020).
91. See USCIS, RAIO DIRECTORATE ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING
COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 12
(Apr. 30, 2019) (emphasis omitted), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
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ing standard.92 While asylum officers are instructed that more than a
“mere possibility of success” is required, they are specifically told that
this standard is lower than a preponderance of the evidence.93 The
majority of the evidence need not establish the individual’s entitlement to asylum, withholding, or CAT protection at this stage.94
The reasonable possibility standard is explicitly higher than the significant possibility standard.95 Although lower than the “more likely
than not” standard, which is used for the ultimate adjudication of
withholding and CAT adjudication claims,96 the reasonable possibility
standard is not a low screening standard.97 On the contrary, it is “the
same standard required to establish eligibility for asylum (the ‘wellfounded fear’ standard).”98 To show a reasonable fear of persecution,
the individual must establish “that the harm [feared] must be serious
enough to be considered persecution,” whereas “in the credible fear
context . . . the applicant need only demonstrate a significant possibility that [the applicant] could establish that the feared harm is serious
enough to constitute persecution.”99 The harm must not only be serious but also reasonably likely to occur.100
This standard is lower than the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard, but officers may not be properly trained to distinguish between the two.101 One training course, when discussing the reasonable
possibility standard, instructs that the asylum officer “should consider
whether a preponderance of the evidence shows that a reasonable
person in the applicant’s circumstances would fear persecution.”102
This standard leaves no room for inferences in the noncitizen’s favor
about what evidence could be available in the future at a full hearing.
Instead, the officer must make a finding regarding the chances of fument/lesson-plans/Credible_Fear_of_Persecution_and_Torture_Determinations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AB7Q-W8MU] [hereinafter CREDIBLE FEAR TRAINING].
92. STANDARDS OF PROOF TRAINING, supra note 89, at 13.
93. CREDIBLE FEAR TRAINING, supra note 91, at 12.
94. Id.
95. USCIS, RAIO DIRECTORATE ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE:
REASONABLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 11 (Feb. 27,
2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/lesson-plans/Reasonable_
Fear_Asylum_Lesson_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE47-BKNP].
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 17.
100. Id. The Supreme Court has suggested that a one-in-ten chance of future persecution would satisfy the reasonable possibility standard. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
101. USCIS, Evidence, in RAIO DIRECTORATE—OFFICER TRAINING 209 (Aug. 3,
2015), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/foia/RAIO_Directorate_Officer_Training_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JE2-A75W].
102. Id.
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ture persecution or torture based on the evidence presented in the
interview.103
C. Same Standard, Vastly Different Protections and Resources: A
Comparison of the Asylum Merits Hearing and the Fear
Screening Interview Setting
The potential for increased use of the reasonable possibility standard in fear screening interviews brings to the forefront the issues associated with using a standard suitable for final determinations on the
merits at the initial screening stage. This standard has been previously
used for reasonable fear interviews, which are the initial screenings for
individuals who have been previously removed from the United States
and have returned to present new fear-based claims.104 However,
these individuals composed only a small minority of those receiving
fear screenings.105 Thus, the reasonable possibility standard has historically been primarily used for final asylum adjudication, and this
should remain the case.106
The setting and procedures used to elicit evidence related to fearbased claims are more significant than one might initially assume. This
is because individuals seeking asylum, withholding, or CAT protection, perhaps at a higher incidence than almost any other group navigating the U.S. judicial system, have by definition experienced
extreme trauma, and the grant or denial of relief hinges on how convincingly they can convey that trauma to a stranger.107 Research has
shown that trauma and cultural norms affect both how individuals record their experiences and how they recount them.108 These factors
make it easy for individuals trying to navigate a novel legal landscape
to fail.
103. See id.
104. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31 (2021).
105. For example, in January 2020, received reasonable fear interviews constituted
less than 18% of all fear screenings (1,027 compared to 4,778 credible fear interviews). Semi-Monthly Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Receipts and Decisions by
Outcome Type: December 16, 2019 to December 31, 2020, USCIS (Jan. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Fear Decisions Data] (on file with author).
106. U.S. immigration courts decided approximately 9,700 asylum cases in January
2020. Asylum Decisions, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/ [https://perma.cc/4NV2-J42R].
107. See Jane Herlihy et al., Just Tell Us What Happened to You: Autobiographical
Memory and Seeking Asylum, 26 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 661, 662 (2012);
KATHRYN SHEPHERD & ROYCE BERNSTEIN MURRAY, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE
PERILS OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL: HOW FAST-TRACK DEPORTATIONS JEOPARDIZE
ASYLUM SEEKERS 9 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_perils_of_expedited_removal_how_fast-track_deportations_
jeopardize_detained_asylum_seekers.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GVC-3KNQ].
108. SHEPHERD & MURRAY, supra note 107, at 9.
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1. Procedural Safeguards at the Asylum Merits Hearing
While procedural safeguards in immigration courts are still much
weaker than those afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings, the
asylum merits hearing is intended to provide the noncitizen facing deportation with “a full and fair hearing of [their] claims and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on [their] behalf.”109
Although the government will not provide an attorney, individuals
in immigration court “have the privilege of being represented” by an
attorney at their expense.110 Being represented by counsel is associated with drastically higher rates of success in immigration court, particularly when the noncitizen is detained, as most asylum-seekers
affected by these rule changes are.111 The U.S. Government Accountability Office has gone as far as to say that “[r]epresentation generally
doubled the likelihood of affirmative and defensive cases being
granted asylum.”112 Additionally, the individual is entitled to “a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against [them], to present evidence on [their] own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the Government.”113
Finally, individuals who are denied asylum by the IJ have the right
to appeal.114 First, the individual must exhaust their administrative
remedies and appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”).115 If the BIA denies relief, the individual may seek review of
their case by the judicial branch by appealing the BIA’s decision to
the United States Court of Appeals.116 If the Circuit Court affirms the
109. See Colmenar v. I.N.S., 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1362.
111. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT 1, 2 (2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.
org/sites/default/files/research/access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UP86-F5HP].
112. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION
COURTS AND JUDGES 30 (2008), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-940.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7AHD-GM54]; see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007) (reporting that represented asylum seekers “were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as
high as the 16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel”); Doe v. Wolf, 432 F.
Supp. 3d 1200, 1213 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (recognizing the importance of counsel in a nonrefoulement interview).
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B).
114. FLORENCE IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RTS. PROJECT, APPEALING YOUR CASE
TO THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 4 (May 2013), https://firrp.org/media/BIAAppeal-Guide-2013_new-BIA-address-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WNG-JPGG].
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (requiring exhaustion of administrative appeals); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2021) (proscribing the BIA’s appellate jurisdiction).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (“The petition for review shall be filed with the court of
appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings.”). Note, however, that at this point in the appeals process, the individual becomes deportable unless the Court of Appeals grants a stay of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(3)(B); Trina Realmuto et al., Practice Advisory: Seeking a Judicial Stay of
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BIA’s decision, the individual may petition the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari.117
2. Problems with the Fear Screening Interview Setting
Although the regulations governing fear screening interviews have
provisions intended to ensure the officer can “elicit all relevant and
useful information bearing on whether the applicant has a credible
fear of persecution or torture,”118 it is well documented that these procedures, even if followed, are insufficient.119 This Section highlights
some of the many known problems with fear screening interviews by
asylum officers, including asylum-seekers’ lack of understanding of
the legal process, their limited access to counsel, and asylum officers’
inconsistent application of procedures.
Various factors make it very difficult for asylum-seekers to obtain
digestible legal information and representation before their fear
screening interviews. Asylum-seekers in expedited removal proceedings are almost all detained, typically from the moment they enter the
United States and often in remote, rural areas.120 Even those who are
able to obtain attorneys experience difficulty in consulting with
them.121 Lawyers of detained clients report restricted access and
changing rules, and a recent lawsuit alleges that Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) does not “allow attorneys representing persons in
its custody to visit such persons for the purpose of confidential legal
advice.”122 The lawsuit further alleges that CBP has “a policy and
practice of denying requests for in-person visits or confidential telephonic communication with counsel at its holding facilities” and that
“lawyers are unable to locate, visit[,] or make confidential phone calls
with their clients.”123
Those who are unable to obtain counsel must rely on information
provided by CBP or Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”).124 CBP is required to give a document explaining the credible fear process to individuals who express a fear of return, but this
form contains confusing terminology and is often not provided in the
individual’s native language.125 Even among those who receive a form
in their language, many still do not understand the process they are
Removal in the Court of Appeals, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1–2 (2014), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/seeking_a_
judicial_stay_of_removal_fin_1-21-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2AA-84Q9].
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c).
118. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d) (2021).
119. See CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 9, at 56–60.
120. Id. at 54, 69.
121. Id. at 53; Doe v. Wolf, 432 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1215 (S.D. Cal. 2020).
122. CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 9, at 53; Wolf, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 1215.
123. Wolf, 432 F. Supp. 3d at 1215.
124. CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 9, at 50–52.
125. Id. at 50.
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about to face.126 Some additional trainings are available in ICE detention, but there are still significant educational and linguistic barriers
that impede understanding.127 Finally, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) asylum officer at the credible fear interview verifies that the individual has received information on the
process.128 While this may be sufficient to inform an educated individual with a straightforward case, it is unreasonable to expect detained
individuals with low education, trauma, and possible health conditions
to understand complicated legal concepts such as “nexus” or “particular social group” no matter how many pamphlets they are given.129
Once the asylum-seeker reaches the fear screening interview, armed
with whatever information they have managed to absorb, technology
can create further barriers to effective communication. The percent of
credible fear interviews taking place telephonically increased from 2%
in 2009 to 59% in 2014, with the greatest prevalence of telephonic
interviews among “asylum seekers in Expedited Removal who crossed
the southern border.”130 This presents a myriad of concerns. First, regulations dictate that interviews may be rescheduled if the noncitizen is
“unable to participate effectively in the interview because of illness,
fatigue, or other impediments,” but these impediments may not be
apparent over the phone.131 Additionally, legal service providers reported that telephonic interviews were “shorter, less accurate, and
more confusing than in-person interviews.”132 In-person follow-ups
were initially required when a telephonic interview resulted in a negative fear finding, but this practice was discontinued in 2013.133 Even
when the interview is conducted in person, translators almost always
appear telephonically, creating similar concerns.134
The problems do not end there. Asylum officers are instructed to
conduct interviews in a “nonadversarial manner” and to “elicit all relevant and useful information.”135 However, confidentiality concerns,
improper demeanor, and failure to give family members the opportunity to interview privately also prevent many asylum-seekers from revealing sensitive but vital portions of their stories.136 One woman
explained as follows:
I did not understand during the interview that the things I told the
officer would remain confidential. My two older children are still
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 51.
See SHEPHERD & MURRAY, supra note 107, at 16–17.
CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 9, at 36.
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(1) (2021).
CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 9, at 36.
Id. at 37.
See SHEPHERD & MURRAY, supra note 107, at 20.
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d) (2021).
See SHEPHERD & MURRAY, supra note 107, at 20–21.
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living in Honduras, and I was very worried during the interview that
the gangs in my town in Honduras would find out what I had told
the immigration authorities in the United States. I was worried that
if I told the officer everything that happened, the gangs would hurt
or kill my two children who remained in Honduras. Because I was
so afraid for my other children, there were certain questions that I
did not answer fully.137

There is also evidence of asylum-seekers failing to share important
information because the asylum officer appeared disinterested, unbelieving, hurried, or aggressive.138 Guidance on interviewing children139
and victims of trauma140 are available to officers, but although training and quality control measures exist, they are not implemented and
recorded reliably.141
Another woman, Isidora, explained that she received a negative
fear finding because she left out parts of her story because her daughter, Daysi, was present.142 She explained as follows:
I didn’t want to mention what was going on because we were interviewed together. My daughter was there, and I didn’t want her to
find out and fall into deeper depression. . . . I did not tell the officer
about the [rape by Daysi’s father] or the phone call [that I received
from the gang members threatening to kill my daughter first and
then end with me] because I did not want my daughter to hear
about it, since she is having problems with her stomach and suffers
with depression.143

Isidora ultimately received a positive fear finding on review by an
IJ,144 but the proposed regulatory changes would make it harder for
those similarly situated to receive such review.145 If the December
2020 rule changes were to go into effect, a negative fear finding at the
interview stage would become final, and the asylum-seeker would be
ordered removed unless the noncitizen were to affirmatively request

137. Id. at 20.
138. Id. at 21–22.
139. Id. at 22.
140. USCIS, RAIO COMBINED TRAINING PROGRAM: INTERVIEWING SURVIVORS
OF TORTURE AND OTHER SEVERE TRAUMA (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/document/foia/Interviewing_-_Survivors_of_Torture_LP_RAIO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65TY-BN7S].
141. SHEPHERD & MURRAY, supra note 107, at 21–22, 26; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-250, ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN USCIS’S OVERSIGHT
AND DATA QUALITY OF CREDIBLE AND REASONABLE FEAR SCREENINGS 21–39
(2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/704732.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5N4-XNXT].
142. SHEPHARD & MURRAY, supra note 107, at 21.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and
Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,273 (proposed June 15, 2020).
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review.146 Under current rules, the finding is forwarded for review by
an IJ unless the noncitizen affirmatively declines review.147
These examples illustrate that the fear screening process is not as
simple as it may appear. Detention, officer misconduct, and technology, among other things, all get in the way of noncitizens seeking protection being able to clearly and convincingly articulate their stories.
3. Lack of Judicial Review
Unlike in formal asylum merits proceedings, the individual who receives a negative fear determination has no right to appeal either to
the BIA or to the federal courts.148 Not only are these fear determinations not directly appealable, but the IIRIRA restricts asylum-seekers’
ability to avail themselves of the federal habeas statute.149 Specifically,
8 U.S.C. § 1252 dictates that “the determination” that an applicant
lacks a credible fear of persecution may not be reviewed by the courts
even when included in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.150 The
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of this provision in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam.151
D. Analysis: Expanded Use of the Reasonable Possibility Standard
Violates the Non-Refoulement Obligation
When proposing the expansion of the reasonable possibility standard to govern all requests for withholding and CAT protection at the
fear screening stage, the government’s essential argument was as follows: Because the standard of proof for a final determination of withholding and CAT protection is “a clear probability” or “more likely
than not,” a lesser, reasonable possibility standard at the interview
stage is appropriate.152 Though logically appealing, this view is oversimplified—while it is true that the noncitizen must eventually meet
this higher more likely than not burden at a full evidentiary hearing,153
the lack of resources and procedural safeguards available to the noncitizen at the fear screening stage make application of the reasonable
possibility standard so early in the process impermissible.
Moreover, the use of the reasonable possibility standard for fear
screenings is at odds with the congressional intent to honor the Refu146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (enumerating matters not subject to judicial review).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963–64 (2020).
152. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. at 36,269.
153. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2), (c)(2) (2021); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) (2021); see
also E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (“A
‘clear probability’ of persecution or torture means that it is ‘more likely than not’ that
applicants will be persecuted upon their removal.”).
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gee Protocol and CAT non-refoulement obligations and with international law, as it increases the risk that individuals will be returned to
their home countries and face persecution, torture, or death. It is instructive to look to Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf where the Ninth Circuit considered the non-refoulement obligation when analyzing the
legality of a fear screening procedure.154 The court first asserted that
the non-refoulement obligation does apply at the fear screening stage,
holding that “Article 33 [of the Refugee Convention] is a general antirefoulement provision, applicable whenever an alien might be returned to a country where his or her life or freedom might be
threatened on account of a protected ground.”155 At issue, among
other thins, was the use of the more likely than not standard at the
fear screening stage.156 The court noted that the more likely than not
standard is usually only applied at a full removal hearing and is much
higher than the typical fear screening standard—significant possibility.157 Considering the use of this high screening standard and the lack
of other procedural safeguards, the court held that the procedure
likely violated the United States’ non-refoulement obligation.158
A similar analysis leads to the conclusion given the insufficient procedural safeguards in place in fear screening interviews, the use of the
reasonable possibility standard violates the non-refoulement obligation. Although the standard in question here, reasonable possibility, is
not as high as the more likely than not standard, it is still higher than
the normal fear screening standard and is normally used at a full removal hearing.159 As detailed above, the fear screening process is
fraught with problems that prevent individuals from having their
claims fairly assessed.160 Access to counsel at the fear screening stage
is extremely limited, and representation is never provided at the government’s expense.161 Information provided to unrepresented individuals on the legal process and standards of proof is limited and difficult
to understand.162 The increased use of technology and the inconsistency of asylum officers often create an environment that, instead of
fostering trust and openness, keeps fearful and traumatized individuals from sharing the most important aspects of their claims.163 These
problems alone create a risk that individuals will wrongfully receive
negative fear determinations and be removed to subsequently face
154. Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated as moot sub
nom. Innovation L. Lab v. Mayorkas, 5 F.4th 1099 (9th Cir. 2021).
155. Id. at 1089.
156. Id. at 1088.
157. Id. at 1088–89.
158. Id. at 1089.
159. See supra Part III.
160. See supra Section III.C.2.
161. See supra Section III.C.2.
162. See supra Section III.C.2.
163. See supra Section III.C.2.
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persecution, torture, or death. This risk is substantially exacerbated by
the almost nonexistent right to appeal and the complete insulation of
these determinations from review by a truly neutral decisionmaker
such as a federal judge.164 These problems, particularly the restricted
access to counsel and appeal, result in the United States falling short
of the Committee Against Torture’s recommended best practices at
the fear screening stage.165 Thus, the standard of proof cannot be
raised without further jeopardizing compliance with the non-refoulement obligation.
A comparison of grant rates in credible versus reasonable fear interviews illustrates that the difference in standards creates a real, practical difference in results. Currently, credible fear interviews employ
the significant possibility standard to screen for fear of persecution or
torture in one’s country of origin.166 Reasonable fear interviews, using
the reasonable possibility standard, are given to individuals barred
from applying for asylum, particularly because they have previously
been ordered removed from the United States.167 Despite the statistic
quoted by the Supreme Court in Thuraissigiam that “[o]ver the last
five years, nearly 77% of screenings have resulted in a finding of credible fear,”168 between December 16, 2019, and December 31, 2020,
only 39% of decisions from credible fear cases were positive.169 Over
the same period, only 13% of reasonable fear determinations were
positive.170 There is no reason to believe that individuals receiving
credible fear interviews systematically have stronger fears of qualifying persecution or torture. Although some individuals are placed in
reasonable fear interviews because of prior aggravated felony convictions, which can bar a grant of withholding of removal, “[a]sylum officers do not consider the mandatory bars to withholding of removal
when making reasonable fear decisions,”171 so this cannot explain the
lower positive-fear rate. If anything, one may speculate that it might
take a stronger fear to make an individual return when they have already been expelled and ordered not to return. Thus, using the reasonable possibility standard instead of the significant possibility
standard likely accounts for fear being established only one-third as
often in reasonable fear interviews.
164. See supra Section III.C.2.
165. See supra Section II.A.
166. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1) (2021).
167. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(a), (c) (2021).
168. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1966 (2020).
169. Out of 21,774 decisions issued, only 8,558 cases established fear. Fear Decisions Data, supra note 105, at 10.
170. Only 875 out of 6,560 decisions established fear. Id.
171. Questions and Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings, USCIS, https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/questions-and-answers-reasonable-fear-screenings (June 18, 2013) [https://perma.cc/XL6S-BGBM].
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Taken together, these factors make it likely that by continuing current practices and expanding the use of the reasonable possibility
standard, the United States will expel individuals seeking refuge using
summary process and return them to face persecution, torture, or
death. This violates the non-refoulement obligation and is contrary to
congressional intent to conform with this international norm.
IV. THE DIRE NEED FOR FULL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR
NONCITIZENS SEEKING PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT
The constitutional guarantee that “no person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”172 appears to
be a clear, universal mandate. However, the application of due process rights is anything but straightforward.173 This is especially apparent with respect to the amount of due process to which noncitizens are
entitled. The Supreme Court has declared that “[noncitizens] who
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law.”174 However, the Court has insisted that for arriving asylum-seekers, regardless of actual physical
presence in the United States, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress,
are due process of law.”175
A. The Entry Fiction Should Not Apply to Individuals Seeking
Withholding and CAT Protection
This denial of due process rights to “arriving aliens” is based on the
plenary power of the Executive to exclude foreigners176 and the “entry fiction,” the legal doctrine that states that “[noncitizens] seeking
admission into the United States may physically be allowed within its
borders pending a determination of admissibility, but . . . are legally
considered to be detained at the border and hence enjoy limited protections under the Constitution.”177 Because decisions regarding who
to admit or exclude are “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the
government of the United States,” these determinations by the political branches are “conclusive upon the judiciary.”178
172. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
173. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993).
174. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
175. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 14 S. Ct. 1959, 1982 (2020) (quoting
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892)).
176. See Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606–09 (1889) (The “Chinese Exclusion Case”).
177. Zainab A. Cheema, Note, A Constitutional Case for Extending the Due Process Clause to Asylum Seekers: Revisiting the Entry Fiction After Boumediene, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 306 (2018).
178. Ping, 130 U.S. at 606, 609.
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This stance is unacceptable with respect to seekers of withholding
and CAT protections. Unlike other immigration benefits, including
asylum, withholding and CAT protections are not privileges that an IJ
has discretion to deny or that Congress can decide to revoke at any
time as a matter of policy.179 Non-refoulement is an obligation created
by domestic and international law.180 Flimsy due process for grants of
initial admission may be acceptable, but stronger procedural protections are necessary when such fundamental life and liberty interests
are at stake. Noncitizens fearing persecution or torture in their home
countries have a statutory right to seek protection against refoulement
regardless of whether they are in the interior of the United States or
present themselves at the border.181 Thus, the entry fiction, while perhaps a permissible policy choice with respect to noncitizens whose admission is a matter of discretion, should not apply to individuals
exercising their congressionally granted right to seek withholding and
CAT protections.
Critics of the entry fiction and its effects on asylum-seekers or inadmissible individuals generally have argued that the functional approach to determining the reach of the Constitution that the Court
used in Boumediene v. Bush182 can be used to extend due process protections to additional noncitizens.183 In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that permitting the political branches to determine “when
and where [the Constitution’s] terms apply” would inappropriately
give them the “power to switch the Constitution on or off at will.”184
The Court thus held that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution185
applied to noncitizens detained at Guantanamo Bay, and therefore
these noncitizens had the right to file habeas petitions.186 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court rejected a formalist approach focusing
solely on territoriality and instead considered practical concerns relating to the detainees’ citizenship, the location of detention, and practical obstacles to facilitating the right.187 Zainab A. Cheema applied this
179. See supra Section II.B.
180. See supra Section II.A.
181. See supra Section II.A.
182. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
183. Cheema, supra note 177, at 293; Charles Ellison, Extending Due Process Protections to Unadmitted Aliens Within the U.S. Through the Functional Approach of
Boumediene, 3 IDAHO CRITICAL LEGAL STUD. J. 1, 5 (2010).
184. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it.”).
186. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
187. Id. at 766; see also Fatma E. Marouf, Extraterritorial Rights in Border Enforcement, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751, 785–86 (2020) (explaining how Justice Kennedy
created this functional approach); Cheema, supra note 177, at 314 (explaining further
the Court’s rationale behind the functional approach).
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functional approach to arriving asylum-seekers188 and reached the following conclusion:
“Practical considerations” shaping the reach of the Constitution
weigh heavily in favor of extending procedural due process protections: the inspection stations for U.S. ports of entry are clearly on
U.S. territory, the ongoing detention of arriving aliens occurs at
U.S. jails or prisons within the interior, and producing them for
bond hearings neither damages the prestige of immigration authorities nor imposes a heavy burden on government resources.189

Although Cheema’s analysis focused on bond hearings as the due process remedy,190 the analysis stands with respect to keeping fear screening standards low, as the burden on government resources is similarly
light.191
The argument for extension is even stronger when considering the
“fundamental rights approach,” which although no longer the dominant approach, “continues to influence decisions implicitly.”192 Under
this approach, “[o]nce a right was determined to be fundamental, it
was required regardless of any practical obstacles.”193 These protected
rights have been defined as being “fundamental in [the] international
sense,” relating to “shared beliefs of diverse cultures.”194 As discussed
above, non-refoulement is an accepted, fundamental international
norm,195 and as such, constitutional due process for individuals seeking protection from refoulement should be considered fundamental
under this approach and therefore unimpeachable.
B. Application of the Mathews Due Process Test to the Proposed
Fear Screening Procedures
Affording more substantial due process rights to seekers of nonrefoulement protections is not a fringe or merely academic idea; Justice Sotomayor, for example, disagrees with the current framework.196
In her dissent to Thuraissigiam, Justice Sotomayor asserts her belief
that “[a]s a noncitizen within the territory of the United States, [an
asylum-seeker] is entitled to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause” regardless of if the noncitizen entered the country legally
or otherwise.197 She characterizes the denial of due process rights to
188. Cheema, supra note 177, at 317–20.
189. Id. at 317.
190. Id. at 290.
191. See infra Section IV.B.
192. Marouf, supra note 187, at 788.
193. Id. at 790.
194. Id. at 789–90 (quoting Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir.
1990)).
195. See supra Section II.A.
196. Dep’t Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 2012 (2020)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
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individuals “who challenge the procedures used to determine whether
they may seek shelter in this country or whether they may be cast to
an unknown fate” as “handcuff[ing] the Judiciary’s ability to perform
its constitutional duty to safeguard individual liberty.”198
This vital liberty interest Justice Sotomayor identified is why the
Mathews v. Eldridge199 due process test should be applied in challenges to asylum procedure. Mathews lays out a three-prong balancing
test to determine if the procedures in question are constitutionally sufficient.200 The factors weighed are:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedures would entail.201

These factors can be applied when testing if the procedure afforded to
individuals seeking withholding and CAT protection is constitutionally adequate.
The private interests at risk when an individual is seeking refuge in
the United States are liberty from fear of persecution or torture and,
ultimately, one’s very life. These are the ultimate human rights and
are the types of interests that fit most squarely within the Due Process
Clause. In Ng v. White, a case not involving asylum, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that deportation may result in “loss of both
property and life, or of all that makes life worth living.”202 For individuals seeking withholding or CAT protection, this chance of loss is
greatly magnified.203 Some have even compared the interest to that of
individuals facing the death penalty, arguing that the Supreme Court
should remember its reasoning that “death is different” because of
“its severity and its finality” when considering what protections to afford individuals who claim they will be killed if returned to their home
country.204
Regarding the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court clarified that “procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as ap198. Id. at 1993.
199. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
200. Id. at 321.
201. Id.
202. Ng v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
203. For a discussion of the severity of persecution faced by asylum seekers, see
Nimrod Pitsker, Due Process for All: Applying Eldridge to Require Appointed Counsel for Asylum Seekers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 169, 185–87 (2007).
204. John R. Mills et al., “Death is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361, 372–73 (2009) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357–58 (1977)).
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plied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”205 The flaws
in the fear screening process that make it systematically more difficult
for individuals to demonstrate their fear of persecution or torture at
the interview stage are well documented and are not “rare exceptions.”206 Moreover, the application of the reasonable possibility standard will increase the risk of erroneous deprivation across the board.
When only 13% of interviewees can prove a reasonable fear and only
a third can prove a credible fear,207 the risk is clear: With the increased use of the reasonable possibility standard, many more individuals who fear for their lives will be unable to advance in the process.
Additional time increases the likelihood that individuals will be able
to access valuable resources such as evidence and legal advice before
presenting their case to a judge. Denial at an early stage creates an
impermissible risk that individuals who would have eventually been
able to prove their claims will be removed—at their peril.
The burden on the government to not expand the use of the reasonable possibility standard is to keep operations as they are. While it is
of course a burden on the immigration court system to process large
numbers of asylum cases, it is not the case that under the significant
possibility standard every individual who expresses any kind of fear
will receive a full hearing.208 Less than half of credible fear decisions
in 2020 were positive.209 So while the government’s interest in reducing immigration court caseloads is legitimate, there are not floodgate
concerns that would overcome the fundamental private interests that
face a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation.
V. CONCLUSION
Immigration law regarding fear-based claims is moving in the wrong
direction, putting vulnerable refugees at risk of persecution, torture,
and death upon erroneous return to their home countries. Withholding and CAT protection must be safeguarded to avoid violating the
non-refoulement obligation. Given the well-documented shortcomings of the fear screening process, requiring a higher standard of proof
to be met at this early stage is impermissible. The reasonable possibility standard requires a determination on the merits and should be reserved for full hearings in immigration court. Additionally, the entry
fiction that denies due process protections to individuals physically
present in the United States while vindicating their rights pursuant to
the non-refoulement obligation should be abandoned. These recommendations are justified because analysis of the Mathews procedural
205. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
206. See supra Section III.C.2.
207. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
208. Only 8,558 out of 21,774 decisions established fear. Fear Decisions Data, supra
note 105.
209. Id.
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due process test reveals that the government’s interest in economy
and efficiency is outweighed by the significant risk of erroneous deprivation of noncitizens’ most fundamental human rights.
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